References: [2011] EWCA Civ 346, [2011] 2 FCR 1, [2011] WTLR 779
Links: Bailii
Coram: Sir Nicholas Wall P, Arden, Black LJJ
Ratio: The claimant, the estranged adult daughter of the deceased, had claimed under the 1975 Act. The judge made an order for payment of andpound;50,000 by way of capitalisation of maintenance. The claimant appealed saying she should have received more, and the charities (beneficiaries under the will) said that no payment should have been ordered at all.
Held: The claimant’s appeal succeeded, and the matter remitted for reconsideration as to quantum. The value judgment of a trial judge, who has undertaken the section 3 exercise and has reached a judgment on the evidence should not be lightly disturbed unless the conclusion reached is ‘plainly wrong’. The district judge here had asked himself the correct question, and it had been wrong to find that he had erred in law.
Arden LJ said: ‘The totemic phrase in section 2(1) of the 1975 Act is ‘reasonable financial provision’. This phrase has a constant meaning, but its application in any individual case must take account of the circumstances of the case and current social conditions and values. There were three notable value judgments by the District Judge in this case. In the first of these, the District Judge held in a passage already cited that the applicant was entitled to make her life with a partner of her choice and to have a family of her own. In the second of these, the District Judge held that it was reasonable for her to wish to remain at home for the time being rather than work (outside the home). In the third of these the District Judge held that families, such as those of the applicant and her husband, ‘were not all to be blamed for their lack of income which makes a claim for tax credits necessary and possible.’ These were evaluations for the District Judge to make in the circumstances of this case. In my judgment the conclusions of the District Judge cannot be said to be plainly wrong.
Indeed, these three value judgments made by the District Judge demonstrate how under the 1975 Act the court must make value judgments in order to arrive at a decision as to whether the provision made by a testatrix constituted reasonable financial provision. I am not concerned that a judge should be called on to make such judgments. It is a reality in the twenty-first century that judges are called upon to make judgments of this kind in different cases and in different circumstances. They must do so with such assistance as they can find in existing decided cases. If (as often happens) there are no decided cases, they must decide questions involving value judgments within four corners of the statutory framework and with the benefit of their own awareness and experience of society and social issues, and their own considered view of how such matters ought fairly to be decided in the society in which we live. It is worthy of note that there was no other way that the District Judge could have made the three value judgments discussed in this paragraph. Judges are not unaccountable for value judgments. Those value judgments can be reviewed on appeal . .’
Black LJ said: ‘A dispassionate study of each of the matters set out in section 3(1) will not provide the answer to the question whether the will makes reasonable financial provision for the applicant, no matter how thorough and careful it is. . . [S]ection 3 provides no guidance about the relative importance to be attached to each of the relevant criteria. So between the dispassionate study and the answer to the first question lies the value judgment to which the authorities have referred. It seems to me that the jurisprudence reveals a struggle to articulate, for the benefit of the parties in the particular case and of practitioners, how that value judgment has been, or should be, made on a given set of facts.’
Statutes: Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 2(1) 3
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:
- Cited – In Re Coventry (deceased) CA ([1980] Ch 461, [1979] 3 All ER 815)
The deceased’s adult son sought provision from the intestate estate. The sole beneficiary under the rules was the plaintiff’s mother. The estate was modest; the intestate’s interest in his house (he had been living there with the plaintiff). The . . - Appeal from – H v Mitson and Others FD ([2010] 1 FLR 1613, Bailii, [2009] EWHC 3114 (Fam))
. . - Cited – Re Gregory (Deceased), Gregory v Goodenough CA ([1970] 1 WLR 1455)
. . - Cited – Cameron v Treasury Solicitor ([1996] 2 FLR 716)
The claimant was the former wife of the deceased. She had been divorced from him 19 years before his death and their matrimonial finances had been settled by a lump sum paid to her as a clean break. There had been no financial relationship between . . - Cited – Snapes v Aram; Wade etc, In re Hancocks (Deceased) CA (Gazette 20-May-98, Times 08-May-98, Gazette 03-Jun-98, Bailii, [1998] EWCA Civ 764, [1998] 2 FLR 346)
The adult daughter of the deceased claimed under the 1975 Act. The deceased had acted entirely reasonably in leaving his business land to those of his children who were active in the business, but after his death part of the land acquired a . . - Cited – In re Dennis (Deceased) ([1981] 2 All ER 140)
The now deceased father had made lifetime gifts to the son. The son now faced substantial liabilities for capital transfer tax, and asked the court to provide for his from the estate under the 1975 Act.
Held: The claim failed. The payment of . . - Cited – Myers v Myers and Others; In the estate of Geoffrey Holt Myers (deceased) FD ([2004] EWHC 1944 (Fam), [2008] WTLR 851)
The adult daughter claimed against her father’s estate. The claimant’s father had left his estate to his widow and the children that he had with her.
Held: Munby J made an award under the Act to an adult child of the deceased, part of which . . - Cited – Re Pearce (Deceased) CA (Gazette 04-Nov-98, [1998] 2 FLR 705)
An adult child succeeded in a claim under the Act against his father’s estate, having worked on his fathers farm for many years and for very low pay against a promise that he would inherit the house on the father’s death. . . - Cited – Espinosa v Bourke CA ([1999] 1 FLR 747)
The claimant was the adult daughter of the deceased. She had been expressly excluded by the deceased from a share in his estate. The claimant had bought a business with the aid of a loan secured by a mortgage. At first instance, Johnson J, dismissed . . - Cited – Fielden, Graham (Executors of Cunliffe deceased) v Cunliffe CA (Bailii, [2005] EWCA Civ 1508, [2006] Ch 361, (2005-06) 8 ITELR 855, [2006] 1 FLR 745, [2006] Fam Law 263, [2006] 2 All ER 115, [2005] 2 WLR 481, [2005] 3 FCR 593, [2006] WTLR 29)
The will was executed anticipating the marriage to the respondent, leaving assets on discretionary trusts for the responent and various family members and others. She had come to work for the deceased as his housekeeper, but later they came to . . - Cited – Piglowska v Piglowski HL (Times 25-Jun-99, Gazette 07-Jul-99, Gazette 20-Oct-99, House of Lords, Bailii, [1999] UKHL 27, [1999] 3 All ER 632, [1999] 1 WLR 1360, [1999] 2 FCR 481, [1999] 2 FLR 763, [1999] Fam Law 617)
When looking to the needs of parties in a divorce, there is no presumption that both parties are to be left able to purchase alternative homes. The order of sub-clauses in the Act implies nothing as to their relative importance. Courts should be . .
(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:
- See Also – Ilott v Mitson and Others FD ([2015] 1 FLR 291, Bailii, [2014] EWHC 542 (Fam))
The claimant sought to appeal against a decision on quantum made under the 1975 Act. The court had awarded her andpound;50k in capital by way of maintenance from her mother’s estate, where the mother had left the estate to animal charities. She had . . - Cited – Wright v Waters and Another ChD (Bailii, [2014] EWHC 3614 (Ch))
The claimant sought provision from her late mother’s estate under the 1975 Act, and asserting a proprietary estoppel. The mother had transferred andpound;10,000 to the daughter several years before. The mother had said it was to be invested on her . . - See Also – Ilott v Mitson and Others CA (Bailii, [2015] EWCA Civ 797, [2016] 1 All ER 932, [2015] WTLR 1399, [2015] 2 FCR 547, [2015] Fam Law 1196, [2015] 2 FLR 1409)
The claimant was the adult and long estranged daughter of her now deceased mother. The mother’s will left the estate entirely to animal charities. The daughter sought reasonable provision under the 1975 Act.
Held: The claimant’s appeal . . - First Appeal – Ilott v The Blue Cross and Others SC (Bailii, [2017] UKSC 17, 2017] WLR(D) 185, Bailii Summary, WLRD, UKSC 2015/0203, SC, SC Summary, SC Video Summar, SC 12 Dec am, SC 12 Dec pm)
The deceased had left her estate in her will to several animal charities. The claimant, her daughter, had been estranged from her mother for many years, and sought reasonable provision from her estate under the 1975 Act. The district judge had . .
(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 01 April 2017
Ref: 431607
The post Ilott v Mitson and Others: CA 31 Mar 2011 appeared first on swarb.co.uk.